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Abstract This article examines the existing contractual arrangements and industry
standards in private equity. It shows that investors are, in principle, capable of
structuring their particular investments according to their own preferences, there are
a range of governance problems and risks that could be potentially hazardous for
some classes of investors. We examine the circumstances where existing industry
codes and legal tools can be used to address the problems that arise in relation to
private equity and buyout activity.
Keywords Private equity  Regulation
1 Introduction
The alternative asset sector successfully avoided the scrutiny of regulators and
lawmakers which arguably contributed to its success in attracting investors. Yet,
with concerns arising from the increased risk due to overleveraged transactions and
the potential costs to investors from insider trading and price fixing arising from
‘club deals’ by mega funds capturing the largest amount of net capital flows, the
trend has moved in the direction of increasing regulation of private equity funds and
their managers. In this context, there is a division of opinion regarding whether
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private equity funds and their investments should be subject to regulation designed
to protect workers and to discourage asset-stripping tendencies. Proponents of
special regulation point to the negative image of private equity arising from
decisions to cut jobs at companies—such as the AA, the UK motor repair services
group, and Gro¨he, the German bathroom fittings maker. They characterize private
equity funds as ‘locusts’ interested only in their own enrichment at the expense of
other interests within the firm. Conversely, the extant evidence seems to decry
regulatory interference by suggesting a positive correlation between private equity
investments and firm performance. Economic studies show that private equity
investment routinely surpasses the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) index, enhances new
product and market development, and increases the levels of employment and R&D
expenditure.
However, the global turbulence in the credit markets, triggered by the turmoil in
the subprime mortgage market in the United States in 2007, has arguably ended the
private equity bonanza as well as the laissez-faire era in the alternative asset sector.
In fact, the credit squeeze has already slowed down the level of private equity
activity and, more importantly for this paper, resulted in increased scrutiny from
regulators, policymakers and the judiciary. We can see, moreover, that a wide range
of regulatory options, from industry self-regulation to governmental intervention,
are being considered in order to lower the level of risk and to redress the balance
between investors and private equity firms. Despite the absence of collapses in the
buyout market, regulators were, even before the downturn, considering a number of
governmental measures designed to reduce the incidence of buyouts, including caps
on leverage limits or limits on the levels of interest payments that are tax deductible.
There may, however, be other motivations that can better explain the demand for
regulatory intervention other than to protect investors from manipulation and to
promote certain regulatory responsibilities. That said, what strategy is ultimately
implemented could be the result of a pent up demand, for example, of enhanced
regulation that is very difficult to differentiate from what is required to ensure that
investors and other stakeholders have an acceptable level of security in dealing with
private equity funds and their advisers.
In the main, private equity funds are regulated by contract. These funds, which
are predominantly formed as limited partnerships, limited liability partnerships or
limited liability companies, are able consequently to take advantage of various
exemptions and exclusions explicitly provided within the regulatory framework.
These business forms are, for example, treated as transparent entities for tax
purposes allowing funds to avoid taxation at fund level and to ‘pass-through’ tax
liabilities to the fund investors. More importantly, the contractual flexibility of the
limited partnership, limited liability partnership and limited liability company
allows the managers and investors to enter into covenants and schemes that align
their incentives and reduce agency costs. To give an example, the investors are
usually permitted to vote on important issues, such as amendments of the
contractual provisions, dissolution issues, removal of managers, and sometimes
even the valuation of the portfolio. At the same time, the ‘private placement’
business arrangement is oriented and structured for large and sophisticated
investors, making it possible to be exempted from the securities regulation
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framework. In the United States, for instance, these funds rely on the exemptions
from treatment under the Securities Act of 1933, the Investment Company Act of
1940, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.1
Still there are important issues that confront the world of private equity. The
private equity industry must face the dilemma of identifying well-suited techniques
to increase transparency and reduce the level of risk without substantially damaging
the flexibility and the benefits of the business models that have prospered on limited
interventions within contractual relations. In a period when private equity
flourished, the mere contractual basis for the funds is usually adequate to address
the agency problems among the players in this sector. However, when the economy
gets weaker and the performance of buyouts is jeopardized because of over-
aggressive capital structures, lawmakers are more likely to intervene without
analyzing the contractual structure of the funds. In this respect, much attention has
been directed recently to the reliability of private equity funds in justifying their
contribution in the strategic performance delivered. In addition to these concerns, a
related set of criticisms that has arisen relate to market abuse, conflicts of interest
and market opacity that are likely to pose questions whether the current regulatory
regime is best suited to address these concerns.
Naturally, the level of regulatory risk will increase substantially should a high
profile buy-out fail, for example, leaving selling shareholders and employees in
distress. Hence, as the risk becomes more critical for companies and their
employees, we would, then, expect more direct government intervention at the
expense of the system of private ordering employed by the funds and their investors.
Financial considerations, however, invariably prevent lawmakers from simply
introducing new legislation that could alter the balance of benefits and gains for the
sector. Besides, mandating legal rules that are inflexible in nature may have
perverse and uncertain consequences on the industry and some firms preventing
them from making well-considered decisions and timely changes in response to
innovations underway in the economy. To see this, we should recall that although
private equity funds have become an essential part of the global financial system,
there is only partial and insufficient information about their governance, impact and
strategies.
In assessing whether a regulatory response is required, it is important to be clear
about which mode is appropriate, and whether the existing regulatory framework is
adequate to address the concerns associated with private equity fund investment.
There are a number of considerations that are relevant. First, is the current structure
sufficient to support private equity led innovation and development. Second, to what
extent are the problems connected with private equity funds familiar, and are the
current set of measures appropriate for dealing with the increased risk generated by
1 The Securities Act regulates the issuance and offering of securities to the public. If funds decide to offer
their services and products to the public, the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 apply. The former governs the operation of the fund itself. The Investment Advisers
Act governs the firms that manage the actual funds. Even if there is currently no requirement that private
equity advisers register under the Act, numerous advisers have, in light of an SEC action against
unregistered adviser, opted to create and maintain oversight and independent review in line with SEC
expectations of fund behavior.
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private equity funds and buyouts. To the extent that a problem does not raise any
new problems for existing regulation, it can be presumed that no fundamental
changes or new measures are required. Third, if the consequence of private equity
fund activity raises a new risk or outpaces the current system of regulation, a
question as to which type of response is required arises. In this context, there is a
choice between self regulation and other regulatory strategies.
As we will see, traditional solutions, such as self-regulation, industry co-
regulation and/or even the resort to regulation, could play an important role in
protecting the stakeholders of the funds as well as the portfolio companies. Self-
regulatory strategies are not new to financial regulation. The potential benefits are
well-established, as evidenced by high levels of firm compliance and significant
reductions in risk and other factors. Moreover, these strategies, if pragmatic and
well-designed, are attractive because they are less burdensome, easily updated and
permit firms to achieve regulatory goals with maximum discretion. Self-regulatory
strategies are likely to be more effective than direct regulation because they are
generated by persons directly involved in the industry. In this context of
implementing such measures, we can expect private equity firms will have high
powered incentives to adopt the standards and controls in a timely and efficient
manner. Moreover, to the extent that large institutional investors are effective
monitors, they can act as a counterweight by exerting pressure on funds that either
under-comply or fail to implement the measures in a timely fashion. The self-
regulation approach works best where the company has wide discretion and
authority over the implementation of the negotiated industry standard.
It may be tempting to conclude that self-regulation is always the optimal strategy.
Concerns about the negative impact of special regulation on the financial industry
abound. Self-regulation can involve complex conflicts of interests, which may have
a detrimental effect on the confidence that investors have in the industry standards.
Moreover, the non-compliance with and enforcement of these regulations is yet
another concern. To be sure, the effectiveness of self-regulation is connected closely
to the incentives of the firms that are providing the measures and the quality of their
efforts to monitor compliance. We are not indifferent to the possibility of ineffective
or misdirected policies, but rather assume that the private equity industry has a stake
in establishing a good reputation for compliance with industry standards. Second,
when private equity funds’ interests diverge from investors’ interests, existing
regulation and market responses should be sufficient for dealing with these
problems. At the same time, it might be that current regulation is not sufficient to
deal with all the risks of private equity funds or illegal conduct, and consequently a
response may be needed.
In this paper, we evaluate whether the existing contractual arrangements and
industry standards are sufficient for dealing with the problems generated by private
equity and buyout funds. We consider the rapid growth of private equity and the
stresses that have arisen as a result. The range of governance problems and risks are
discussed in terms of whether regulatory intervention is warranted. We discuss the
effectiveness of different regulatory models and examine the existing regulatory
structure in Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The
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survey of the diverse regulatory environments reveals which type of measures have
been considered by regulators, and the reforms that have been implemented.
The paper is divided into five parts. Part 2 sets out background facts and figures
that are relevant to understand the role of regulation and how it influences the
players in this industry. We will make no attempt to provide an in-depth analysis of
the economic impact of private equity, but will focus on the structure, investment
objectives and investment strategies of private equity funds. These facts and figures
offer important insights and observations about the trends and challenges in this
alternative asset sector. Part 3 describes the terms and conditions of fund formation
and operation, management fees and expenses, profit sharing and distributions, and
corporate governance. The contractual features show that parties are in principle
capable of structuring their particular ownership and investment instruments
according to their own preferences without being bound to regulatory requisites. In
this Part, we also focus on hedge funds. Typically, these funds use similar business
forms, but, in contrast to private equity funds (which primarily invest in
unregistered securities), they are structured by a team of skilled professional
advisers, experts in company analysis and portfolio management, offering investors
a wide range of investment styles. Hedge fund managers employ multiple strategies
as well as traditional techniques and use an array of trading instruments such as
debt, equity, options, futures and foreign currencies. Since hedge funds are
characterized by the pursuit of absolute returns and the use of leverage to enhance
their return on investment, the hedge fund industry also encounters increased
scrutiny from regulators and lawmakers. The question then is if, and under what
conditions, special regulations should come to the fore. Now that both the buyout
branch of the private equity industry and hedge funds face sharp criticism from
lawmakers, labour unions and shareholders in publicly held companies, the
industry—convinced of the value-increasing effect of their investments and the
benefits for employment, innovation, and research and development—increasingly
responds by introducing self-regulatory measures to improve the transparency and
accountability of private equity funds and hedge funds across the board. Part 4 will
explain the function of soft law principles, guidelines and recommendations,
specifically tailored to the activities of private equity funds. We will assess if self-
regulation will come to be seen as a pragmatic and workable approach despite its
purported disadvantages, such as the lack of public confidence or the possible inertia
on the side of the self-regulatory body. Part 4 also addresses the role of regulators
and lawmakers in a number of major jurisdictions, outlining the existing industry
codes and legal tools that can be used to address the problems that arise in relation
to private equity and buyout fund activity. Part 5 concludes.
2 The growth of private equity
The private equity industry has seen tremendous growth over the last decade, going
from less than $10 billion raised worldwide in 1991 to over $180 billion in 2000.2
2 See Kaplan and Schoar (2005).
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Today, almost a decade later, private equity shows no signs of slowing down. In
fact, private equity raised a record $406 billion in 2006. Table 1 shows a summary
of the leading private equity funds and buyout firms in terms of total value of funds
raised over the last decade.
2.1 The performance of private equity
This section looks at the performance of private equity firms, particularly the returns
of buyout funds. In the case of buyouts, the private equity firms that sponsor and
structure the deal will arrange significant debt financing in order to take over a
company. Typically, debt financing for buyout is raised from the syndicated debt
market in Europe and the US.3 Private equity firms look for target firms in which
there is fundamental inequality between market capitalization and firm value. The
buyout firm has high powered incentives to increase the value in the target. Value
enhancements that are agency driven extract performance improvements through
installing new management, active monitoring and fundamental changes in the
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3 See McCahery and Schwienbacher (2010).
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firm’s business plan. It is noteworthy that the high debt obligations may induce
firm’s to undertake fundamental governance reforms that can lead to performance
improvements. Correspondingly, the high debt levels imply that the tax deductibility
of interest are increased. Notice that performance improvements are also the result
of financially driven arbitrage opportunities that arise as a consequence of
differences in the company valuations.
Whatever the source of gain, the value of the equity investment will increase as a
result of high leverage. Questions arise about whether the recent buyout boom was
agency or financially-driven. To be sure, even though both elements have
contributed, few observers would place primary emphasis on the agency side. As
noted, readily available credit at low rates is probably a better explanation. Consider
that risk premium on junk bonds over Treasuries reached a historic low of 2.63%,
compared to the 20 year average of 5.42%. Recall that while buyouts returned to
1990s levels, the leverage in the capital structures was less than it had been in the
earlier period. The average ratio of cash flow to interest cost was 3.4 in deals closing
in 2004, 2.6 in 2006 and 1.7 in 2007. At the same time, many of the loans were also
‘covenant lite’, omitting debt covenants and ratio tests. In terms of the measuring
the use of covenant lite debt, the volume reached $48 billion in the first quarter of
2007, compared with $24 billion in 2006.
Shifting now to the returns earned by private equity, we discuss the performance of
funds as measured by investors. Even though private equity funds disclose information
to investors about returns, it is often difficult to obtain accurate information because
funds are under no legal obligation to disclose. Most financial economists rely on data
bases collected from voluntary reports of private equity funds, which include
information on returns. In terms of measuring fund manager performance, there are
two leading measures used, namely the internal rate of return (IRR) and total value
paid in (TVPIP), which supplies an estimate of the size of profits to investors relative to
their initial investment in the fund.4 A recent study, by Kaplan and Schoar, on US
private equity returns analyzed the returns of 169 buyout funds that were close to fully
liquidated in the period of 1980–2001.5 They break the results into time periods to
show that the IRRs were better for funds raised in the early 1980s and poorer for funds
raised in the early 1990s. Moreover, they find that the average returns earned by
investors in funds started by 1995 are about the equivalent of the amount that would
have been earned on the S&P. A related study by Phalippou and Gottschlag, which
revised and extended Kaplan and Schoar’s data, indicates that the net returns by
private equity funds lagged public equity markets by as much as 3.3% per year.6
2.2 The supply and demand side of private equity
Private equity can be defined as the investment of equity in non-listed companies.
On the supply-side of private equity, we find the private equity fund, which is a
3 See McCahery and Schwienbacher (2010).
4 See Jenkinson (2007).
5 See supra note 2.
6 See Phalippou and Gottschlag (2009).
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vehicle formed to pool the capital of different investors, such as pension funds,
insurance companies, university endowments, and other wealthy individuals. They
pool their money with others so that the fund can help to spread the risk of the
investment. Professional fund managers invest the capital across a wide range of
different holdings. The value of the investments can go up and down depending on
the returns of the different investments. Investments of pooled investment vehicles
are characterized by high expected returns and high risks. There are a number of
reasons to invest in pooled investment vehicles which include: (1) to spread the risks
and (2) investors have access to markets where the money has the potential for
capital growth.
On the demand side, the pooled capital can be made available at several stages in
a company’s life. Private equity can take the form of venture capital. Venture capital
funds have become the main funding source for high-growth businesses in the start-
up and the expansion phase. Buy-out funds form another subset of private equity.
These funds can decide to buy a business from a vendor (an institutional buy-out). If
the target company’s assets are used as collateral to raise additional debt to finance
the acquisition, this is called a leveraged buy-out. It is also possible that private
equity funds assist the existing (management buy-out) or new managers (manage-
ment buy-in) in taking over a non-listed firm. Finally, private equity funds may
decide to buy and acquire the shares of a publicly traded company. This is a so-
called public-to-private buy-out. Thus there are two types of private equity funds:
venture capital funds and buy-out funds.
Venture capital funds come in three variations in the United States: small
business investment companies (SBICs),7 traditional venture capital funds, and
corporate venture capital funds. In the United States, private equity is often
associated with financing and developing companies that are unable to attract
sufficient debt financing to support and finance their high-growth and often high-
tech businesses. Not yet revealed and unproven technologies, the lack of liquid
assets and the importance of human capital make bank finance unsuitable for these
companies. Since future revenue streams are highly indefinable, access to debt
financing through for instance asset backed securitization transactions remains a
major obstacle for these firms. In the venture capital segment, fund managers make
investments in businesses in which they play an important role in monitoring and
participating in the day-to-day activities of management. In the first quarter of 2007,
venture capitalists invested $7.1 billion in 778 deals in the United States only, which
is highest amount invested since the boom period of 2001–2002.8 Recent success
stories include YouTube, Web 2.0, and Google. The post-boom resurgence has seen
a noticeable shift in the venture capital industry, with data revealing the increasing
role of corporate venture capital.9 The surge in corporate venture capital is
attributable to a new level of risk-taking by large companies that are looking to
7 Under the Small Business Administration Act of 1958, the Small Business Administration (SBA) is
authorized to license SBICs to make equity and loan investments in smaller entrepreneurial firms in the
United States.
8 See US National Venture Capital Association (2007).
9 See US National Venture Capital Association (2006).
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profit from investment in new technology and other innovations. With larger
companies, such as Cisco, Intel, IBM, Kodak, Microsoft, and Siemens, expanding
the scope of their operations to invest in start-ups, entrepreneurs tend to exploit the
opportunity to obtain not only financial, but also technical and managerial
assistance.
There may be several reasons why alliances between a start-up and a
multinational may bear fruit for the venture. First, the start-up may very well
offer strategic value of synergy to the multinational’s core businesses. Second, even
though a high rate of return is usually not the investor’s main objective (thereby
giving more stability to the venture), having a well-performing high-growth
company in the portfolio may prove to be very lucrative. Third, it is generally
accepted that these alliances often increase the credibility and reputation of the start-
up firm. But there are also a number of disadvantages associated with the
involvement of corporate venture capital funds. In particular the complexity of the
transaction and the time-consuming decision-making procedures within large firms
make traditional venture capital funds a more accessible source of private equity
capital financing for high-tech start-ups. Alliances with corporate investors require
the negotiation and drafting of a multitude of ancillary agreements relating to the
promoting, selling, licensing and developing of technology and knowledge. More
importantly, corporate investors are more inclined to carefully reconsider the
investment and pull the plug in the event of a major downturn.
That is not to say that starting a business with capital from traditional venture
capital pools is an easy task to accomplish. Venture capitalists tend to monitor and
protect their investments through active participation, namely by due diligence,
establishing a relationship with the start-up businesses’ managers and by sitting on
their board of directors. As soon as venture capitalists are hooked and involved,
entrepreneurs and other key employees should be ready to abdicate control over
their company. To be sure, venture capitalists will not typically depose an
entrepreneur by acquiring a majority of the corporation’s common shares. This is
usually counterproductive, as discrepancies between them and the entrepreneur,
implying an increase in agency costs. Allocating a substantial equity stake in the
firm to the entrepreneur and other employees, which is akin to the stock option
compensation system, fortifies the incentive to conduct the business diligently and
discourages shirking and opportunism. Instead of seeking a majority of the
corporation’s equity, venture capitalists usually obtain control by utilizing
complicated contractual mechanisms in their relationship with the entrepreneurial
team and other investors. These contractual mechanisms protect the venture
capitalists extensively from adverse selection and moral hazard problems. For
instance, the use of staged financing and convertible preferred stock form an optimal
combination which gives motivated entrepreneurs an incentive to take significant
risks in order to increase firm performance while securing downside protection for
venture capitalists.
The success of a venture capital market is mainly due to a private ordering
regime in which contractual mechanisms are preferably employed to mitigate
agency costs and to support the efficient structuring of staged financing and the
sustained level of new entrepreneurs with high capacity to achieve their commercial
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aims.10 Governmental interference and oversight appears to be counterproductive.
Recent research seems to suggest that government initiatives could crowd out the
supply of venture capital. Suppose, for instance, that a tax incentive to encourage
individual investors to pour money into special venture capital funds turns out, in
fact, to reduce the supply of other, relatively more informed venture capital
investments by institutional investors.11
By way of comparison, we look to buy-out funds which invest mainly in mature
companies. The legal structure that makes the buyout market so effective also
begins with the private equity fund by which providers of capital convey money to
the fund managers who are running the business and actively making the
investments in portfolio companies. Like venture capital funds, the relationship is
governed merely by contractual provisions which allow the fund managers enough
time and space to take firms private and restructure them. Note, however, that are
significant differences in the organizational structure of venture capital and buyout
funds. For example, buyout funds typically invest in mature companies with fairly
predictable cash flows, which causes investors to give less leeway to the managers
and to demand a minimum rate of return before profits are shared with the
managers.
Until recently, buy-outs accounted for less than 10% of total number of
investments. The statistical evidence shows the buy-out business continues to boom
(The Economist, February 10, 2007), increasing in recent years to 20% in 2005
(EVCA data 2000–2005). For Europe, the total amount of private equity deals in
Europe was €178bn, 41% higher than in 2005.12 Remarkably the European market
is dominated by US-based buyout firms. Overall, more than half of the funds raised
in the private equity sector are invested in MBO/MBIs.
A clear pattern emerges from the many empirical studies that describe the LBO
booms. It is worth noting that the 1980s LBOs boom was largely a US phenomenon.
However, with the current LBO wave, the centre of gravity has shifted from the US
to Europe and the UK. This should come as no surprise since the European economy
has performed much better than in the 1980s. What are the causes for the current
expansive round of LBOs? The now-standard explanation for the highly favourable
circumstances to complete deals is the easy credit terms and low interest rates which
have prevailed until recently. A second explanation looks to the pressures on fund
managers which prompted them to increased the allocation levels for this particular
class of assets. A third explanation points to the self-interested behaviour of the
managements of public companies which have responded to shareholder pressure to
obtain higher prices from private equity bidders. Another key feature of the boom
has been the increase in corporate governance pressures. As a result, the cost of
D&O insurance has increased substantially in the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley, which
made executives personally liable for the accounting practices of their companies.
In addition, we have also seen more shareholder scrutiny of executive pay. Given
this, talented managers usually receive more generous compensation packages when
10 See Gilson (2003).
11 See Cumming and MacIntosh (2006).
12 See Financial News (James Mawson), Private equity levels double in Europe, 29 January 2007.
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switching to a firm controlled by a private equity company. Finally, many laws,
regulations and other measures are probably also responsible for the infrastructure
to complete deals. One obvious message is that a favourable infrastructure is crucial
for the acceleration of the private equity process.
At the same time, the case for leverage may have negative implications. It is also
noteworthy that the buyout market, which peaked in the middle of 2007, collapsed
rapidly in the last half of 2007 with the contraction in the credit market. During the
most recent boom period, the leverage in private equity buyouts averaged about
two-thirds. In Europe, buyout funds relied almost exclusively on banks and the
syndicated loan market to fund their investments. The economic impact of private
equity on the loan market has been significant given the amount of equity raised for
highly leveraged buyouts over the past decade.13
However, with the credit crunch making it harder to place buyout debt, the
average size of buyouts this year has fallen to $120 million (Thomson Financial
2008). In the current environment, there are few incentives for private equity funds
to make investments and draw down their clients’ capital. This suggests that much
of the new capital raised by private equity funds remains un-invested. Thus, to the
extent that the current collapse parallels the 1989 decline in the buyout market, there
will be a challenge for agency theory. While agency theorists identified faults in
regulation for the earlier collapse, there is no easily identifiable regulation that can
be held to account for this most recent decline in the market. As the recent wave has
shown, buyouts take place only when the capital structure of target firms can be
leveraged up with debt. So, even if fund managers have incentives to improve the
performance of target firms through agency-driven improvements, it is unlikely that
the potential for performance improvements alone could suffice for triggering a
buyout wave.14
3 Dealing with agency problems: contractual arrangements
In this section, we begin by reviewing the similarities between private equity and
hedge funds. We then discuss the extent to which the two fund types differ. At first
glance, one noticeable incidence of convergence is the extent to which hedge funds
13 See supra note 4.
14 Equally, we would expect fund managers to look to alternative sources of capital, such as sovereign
wealth funds which have an estimated combined resources of $2,000 billion to $3,000 billion, to step into
the place of banks in funding leveraged buyouts. While it is easy to see why buyout firms are moving
towards sovereign wealth funds, we have to acknowledge that a majority of these funds are unlikely to
supply debt for buyouts for private equity firms. Reasons for the hesitance of large sovereign wealth funds
to be a new source of capital for these deals may include the acknowledgement that they do not currently
have the institutional capacity to manage more risky investments. Also, many mutual and sovereign
wealth funds may be unwilling to lend in the circumstances where the sweetened terms are not
sufficiently high to meet the investment objectives of the fund managers. We conjecture that sovereign
wealth funds do not have the investment objectives, time or specialized skills with which to efficiently
monitor and add value to investments in private equity and buyout funds. It is possible that private equity
will continue to innovate and find new sources of funding, but it is more likely that the new sources will
not be sufficient to support the level of debt required by these firms. Until confidence returns in the credit
markets, the level of debt involved in private equity and buyouts will be considerably smaller than before.
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and private equity managers pursuing similar assets and investment strategies to
secure superior market returns. When hedge fund advisers are dissatisfied with
traditional strategies and unable to obtain their desired rates of return, they have
moved quickly to adopt those strategies usually employed by private equity funds,
such as corporate restructuring and buyouts, to achieve better value on their
investments. This is partly due to the overcrowding of the hedge fund market place.
This has led to clashes with traditional private equity funds. A noteworthy example is
the bidding war between one of the largest private equity firms, Kohlberg Kravis
Roberts & Co, and Cerberus Capital Management for the acquisition of Toys ‘R’ Us.
Thus, the recent emergence of hedge funds competing with private equity firms
for target companies to take private is another example of how these two forms are
converging. There are a number of factors that account for this trend. First, the
increased number of funds and new capital flowing into private-equity and hedge-
funds make it harder for advisers to produce premium returns. Second, debt
continues to be relatively abundant worldwide and at relatively attractive rates.
Third, hedge funds and buyout funds are increasingly seeking the same cost savings
and synergies that strategic buyers have always employed to justify their higher
multiples. Effectively, these trends have blurred the differences between the two
fund types.
The increased convergence has led hedge funds to incorporate private equity type
features in their fund structures, reducing investor flexibility through side pockets
(investments in illiquid stakes, which are accounted for in terms of administrative
fees and incentive fees separately from the fund), gates (caps on the amount of
annual withdrawals from the fund by investor to manage liquidity risk) and lock-ups
(restrictions preventing investors from withdrawing from the fund within a specified
period). Of course, one can cast doubt on whether these strategies can generate
solutions for all the problems associated with hedge funds providing their investors
with diverse investment opportunities. As long as management and performance
fees are based on striking a net asset value of the fund, hedge fund investors are
willing to pay the fees. However, investors are more likely to challenge performance
payments to an adviser that has invested in illiquid securities that may not have an
easily ascertainable market value. Private equity funds have addressed this concern
through distributions based solely on realized events or the use of clawback
provisions that mandate funds to return performance fees if the fund subsequently
goes into a loss position. These strategies to manage valuation risk have been
resisted so far by the hedge fund industry.
Despite these similarities, private equity and hedge funds differ in a number of
important respects. For instance, private equity can be distinguished from hedge
funds in terms of their investment strategies, lock-up periods, and the liquidity of
their portfolios (see Table 2).
Moreover, private equity fund managers have incentives to take large illiquid
positions in the non-listed securities of private companies. Investments made by
private equity funds take place during the first 3–5 years of the fund, which is
followed by a holding period which averages between 5 and 7 years in which few
new investments are made. Unlike private equity, the shorter lock-in period of
hedge funds and their more flexible structure explains the dominance of highly
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liquid, short-term investments which allow investors easier access to the withdrawal
of their investment funds. In the next section, we examine the typical structures used
by pooled investment vehicles, namely private equity and hedge funds. We focus on
the three parties: (1) the general partner; (2) the investment adviser; and (3) the
limited partners. We consider the extent to which hedge funds and private equity
employ similar legal forms and contractual provisions between the GP and LPs. We
note that despite some overlap in fund structure and organization, private equity and
hedge funds typically employ different trading strategies, compensation and
governance arrangements which are reflected in the main contract between the GP
and the investors.
3.1 The relationship between investors and fund managers: the limited
partnership structure
A fund of a private equity firm, hedge fund or venture capital firm is a pooled
investment. The fund can be seen as a vehicle formed to pool the capital of different
investors. Contributors to these funds are institutional investors, pension funds,
university endowments and other wealthy individuals. They pool their money with
other so that the fund can help to spread the risk of the investment. Professional fund
managers invest the capital across a wide range of holdings. The value of the
investments can go up and down depending on the returns of the different
investments. Investments of pooled investment vehicle are characterised by high
expected returns and high risks. There are a number of reasons to invest in pooled
investment vehicles which include: (1) to spreading of risks; and (2) gaining access
to markets with the potential for capital growth.
Table 2 Hedge funds vs. private equity funds
Traditional hedge fund Traditional private equity
Investment
strategies
Investment in liquid securities that can
be marked-to-market easily
Investment in illiquid equity stakes, for
example stakes in private companies
Pursue alpha generating strategies
(risk arbitrage)
Add value for the fund through
screening
Fund structure Typically LP Typically LP
Management
vehicle
LLC or corporation LLC or corporation
Other fund terms Upfront investment (100% at
subscription date)
Commitment upfront plus drawings
over time
No lock-up periods; investors can
access or exit the fund periodically
Investors typically do not have
withdrawal rights and are locked-up
for multiple years
Perpetual Term
Management fees are typically 1% of
NAV of the fund and paid quarterly
Management fee is typically 2% of
committed capital and paid quarterly
Incentive fee: 20%, paid periodically,
no clawbacks
Incentive fee: 20%, paid upon
realization of profits, subject to
clawbacks
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In the United States and elsewhere, the limited partnership form is the dominant
legal vehicle used in hedge fund and private equity structuring. Both fund types are
usually organized as a LP, with a GP and management company, both structured as
separate legal entities, and the limited partners (see Fig. 1).
As we have seen, the popularity of this form is due to its contractual nature which
allows the internal and external participants to reduce opportunism and agency
costs. Indeed, the limited partnership structure permits fund managers to achieve
extensive control over the operation of their funds subject to few intrusive legal
obligations. Other features, such as tax benefits, the flexibility surrounding its
structure and terms, and its fixed life, contribute to its continuing viability as the
business form of choice for collective investment vehicles. The LP has other
important advantages as well. First, it is familiar to most investors and
intermediaries, which contributes to its enduring popularity. Second, there is a
risk that LLCs, operating outside the US, could be treated as a non-transparent
foreign entity and taxed as a corporate body. As a consequence, some sponsors are
reluctant to switch to the LLC.15 Typically the sponsor will invest between 1% and
3% of the fund’s total commitments. In order to obtain fees, the sponsor will create
two entities: an LP and a management company, which is organized either as an
LLC or corporation. Moreover, the management company is either a separate entity
from the GP or affiliated with one of the GPs, or is a subsidiary of a bank or
insurance company and, accordingly, will exercise effective control over the GP and
fund manager. With a management company, the day to day management is
separated from the fund which may assist in resolving some tax issues while
limiting doing business and other concerns.
The relationship between the limited partners and the general partners mainly
relies on explicit contractual measures. Table 2 below shows the most common
Fig. 1 Typical private equity fund structure
15 Nevertheless, some sponsors are now beginning to structure their funds as a Delaware LLC since it has
the same organizational flexibility and tax efficiency as the LP.
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contractual measures that have been developed for dealing with the investment
activities of GPs, and the relationship between GPs and LPs inside private equity
funds.
A key contractual technique, for example, is the compensation arrangement
between the fund manager and the investors. Compensation derives from the two
main sources. First, fund managers typically receive 20% of the profits generated by
each of the funds. The second source of compensation is the management fee.
Historically, a significant majority of funds assess management fees as a constant
percentage of committed capital. It is noteworthy that there has been a decrease in
the management fees in recent years due to a number of economic factors. In
particular, some funds are more likely to have a fixed fee of 2% of the funds assets
which is paid annually for 5 years and then decreases by 25 basis points for the next
5 years period. Other fund managers will allow reductions of the fixed fee based on
a change from committed capital in years 1–5 to net invested capital in year 6–10.
Given these changes, a substantial proportion of buyout firms’ median take off-the-
top of committed capital has been reduced to 12% (Table 3).16
To be sure, investors attempt to maximize fund managers performance by
insisting on hurdle rates that climb upwards to 15–20%, which means that profits
can only be distributed after a certain threshold has been reached. Thus, from the
perspective of private equity, the contractual flexibility of the limited partnership
plays a central role in aligning the interests of management and investors. For
instance, in order to protect the 80/20 deal, a clawback provision will be included in
the agreement that provides than an overdistribution to a GP will be clawed back to
the fund and then distributed to the LPs. What triggers a clawback provision?
In practice, clawbacks can be triggered when the preferred return or hurdle is not
reached and the GP obtained carried interest or if the GP has received more carried
interest than the agreed 20% of cumulative net profits. Here we can use an example
Table 3 Limited partnership agreement: negotiating the terms
General partners Limited partners
Carry calculations Carry calculations
Management fees Claw-back provisions
Claw-back provisions General partner conflict issues, including
limitations of opportunities
General partner capital commitment Key-man provisions
Limitations of liability Management fees
Indemnification by general and limited partners General partner capital commitment
Investment strategy, limitations and guidelines Side letters
Fundraising period, investment period and term Investment strategy, limitations and guidelines
Permitted activities of general partners Permitted activities of general partners
Limited partner approval rights Portfolio company fee offsets
Source: Adapted from Center for Private Equity and Entrepreneurship, Tuck School of Business at
Dartmouth
16 See Metrick and Yashida (2010).
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to show how the clawback is intended to function. If we assume that a fund has six
investments: A to F with each was purchased for $100. Also assume that five of
these investments were sold each year for $200. As a result, the GP receives a
carried interest of 20% and the LP receives 80% of the cumulative profits of the
investments and of course the contributed capital. But, the 6th project defaults to $0.
Thus, the total net profits of the fund are $400 - (500 - 100 loss) or 67% for the
LPs. Yet, it was agreed that the GP would receive 20% of the net profits, or $80. But
the GP received $100, which accordingly triggers the clawback provision.
It is noteworthy that there also number of approaches for structuring the
clawback obligation, including the ‘‘pay it back now’’ approach or the segregated
reserves approach. Under the first approach, the GP will immediately provide a
clawback to the LPs. This method is remarkably straightforward and requires a
potentially large cash contribution by a group of individual managers who may not
have the financial ability to make the required contribution. In contrast, the reserve
account approach places costly constraints on managers by requiring that the cash
deposited in the reserve account is invested in a safe, cash-equivalent instrument in
order to satisfy eventually the clawback obligation. At the same time, there is also a
limited partner clawback which is intended to protect the GP against future claims,
should the GP become the subject of a lawsuit. For the most part, the clause will
include limitations on the timing and amount of any judgement.
Finally, as it happens, many LP contracts will include a preferred return
provision. This is a minimum return rate which ranges from 5 to 10%. The idea of
preferred return is that it affects the timing of the carried interest. Such a targeted
return must be met before the fund manager can share in the fund profits. Preferred
returns are normally required by LPs who make commitments to new funds or funds
involved in buy outs. Most priority returns have a catch up provision, which permits
a reallocation of the profits to the GP after the priority return has been distributed to
the LPs (Table 4).17
Overall, the contractual mechanisms for determining GP’s compensation include
both a profit sharing arrangement that balances investors’ concerns regarding pay-
for-performance, and a distribution scheme to investors to limit overall fund risk-
taking. Moreover, there are a variety of factors that affect fund manager
compensation. First, fund managers are expected to have higher fixed fees and
Table 4 A clawback example
GP LP
Profits 5 9 0.20 9 100 = $100 5 9 0.8 9 100 = $400
Contributed capital 5 9 100 = $500
Initial investment 6 9 100 = $600
Investment return (5 9 200 - (6 9 100))/600 = 67%
17 Interestingly, while the literature has spent much time analyzing the optimal compensation structure
for GPs, recent empirical work has found that legal and institutional factors explain the differences in
fund manager payment terms, the timing of the distributions to investors, and the probability of clawbacks
(Cumming and Johan 2006).
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carried interest percentages in jurisdictions with high quality legal rules and
enforcement environment. Second, fund focus and characteristics can result in quite
different outcomes for fund managers. For example, funds focusing on venture
capital investment are more likely to require professional staff and expertise which
leads to lower yields and higher performance fees to align interests. Conversely,
larger funds, such as buyout funds, are more likely to have lower fixed
compensation because they require less staff than funds focusing on venture
capital. Finally, the type of institutional investor and their risk appetite may
influence the fixed and variable fee structure of fund managers.
3.2 The relationship between investors and fund managers: restrictive covenants
In the previous section, we examined how the flexibility of the limited partnership
form allows the internal and external participants to enter into contractual
arrangements that align the incentives of fund managers with those of outside
investors. If well structured, the limited partnership agreement can effectively
reduce agency costs. In this section we turn to consider how limited partners are
usually permitted, despite restrictions on their managerial rights, to vote on
important issues such as amendments of the partnership agreement, dissolution of
the partnership agreement, extension of the fund’s life, removal of a general partner,
and the valuation of the portfolio. In addition, we examine how limited partners
employ several contractual restrictions when structuring the partnership agreement
depending on the asymmetry of information and the market for investment
opportunities.
In recent years, a number of law and finance scholars have studied the role and
frequency of covenants in the agreements between institutional investors and
professional fund managers. An early study by Gompers and Lerner (2006) focuses
on restrictive covenants imposed by institutional investors on fund managers in
respect of the operation of the fund. They grouped the venture capital fund
restrictive covenants into three categories: (1) restrictions on management of the
fund; (2) restrictions on the activities of the GP; and (3) restrictions on the types of
investment.18
In terms of the first category of covenants, the first restriction in this class
involves limits on the size of investment in any one firm which discourages the GP
from allocating a large portion of the fund to a single investment. This is similar to
the restrictions on the type of behaviour that would increase the leverage of the fund
and thereby amplify the risk for institutional investors. A restriction on co-
investment is designed to limit the opportunism of fund managers so as to avoid one
fund artificially improving the performance of another. A second category of
covenants are designed to limit the investment activities of the GP. The restriction
on co-investment by fund managers is designed to limit the agency problem which
might arise from selective attention to certain portfolio firms at the expense of the
18 See Axelson et al. (2009). The frequency of standard covenants in limited partnership agreements,
suggested by Gompers and Lerner’s evidence, is related to funds having to seek third party investment for
all investments above a specified fraction of the fund’s level (20%) or for taking on leverage at the fund
level.
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performance of the entire fund. The covenant is designed to limit the sale of fund
interest by fund managers to ensure that their commitment to the fund is not
compromised. Further, the key person provisions and restrictions on additional
partners is intended to ensure that management does not opportunistically hire new
personnel to manage the fund in breach of their commitments made to the LPs. The
third category of covenants is related to restrictions on types of investment that GPs
can make. These covenants reduce or eliminate the potential for management to
opportunistically alter the focus of the fund for their own profit at the expense of
investors. Restrictions include limitations on investments in venture capital, public
securities, LBOs, foreign securities and other asset classes.
In the context of determining the frequency of the covenants for such funds,
Gompers and Lerner found that the number and type of covenants correspond to the
uncertainty, information and asymmetry and agency costs in the portfolio
companies. Table 5 shows the distribution of covenants for VC funds.
They demonstrated, moreover, that there is positive relationship between the use
of restrictions and the propensity of the fund managers to behave opportunistically.
As Table 5 shows, there are a number of distinct covenants that address problems
relating to the management of the fund, conflict of interests, and restrictions on the
type of investment the fund can make. Other factors affecting the use of restrictions
are the fund’s size, the compensation system of the managers, and their reputation.
Table 5 Distribution of covenants in venture capital funds
Description % of Covenants
Covenants relating to the management of the fund
Restrictions on the size of investment in any one firm 77.8
Restrictions on use of debt by partnership 95.6
Restrictions on coinvestment by organization’s earlier or later funds 62.2
Restrictions on reinvestment of partnership’s capital gains 35.6
Covenants relating to the activities of the general partners
Restrictions on coinvestment by general partners 77.8
Restrictions on sale of partnership interests by general partners 51.1
Restrictions on fund-raising by general partners 84.4
Restrictions on other actions by general partners 13.3
Restrictions on addition of general partners 26.7
Covenants relating to the type of investment
Restrictions on investments in other venture funds 62.2
Restrictions on investments in public securities 66.7
Restrictions on investments in leveraged buyouts 60.0
Restrictions on investments in foreign securities 44.4
Restrictions on investments in other asset classes 31.1
Total number of partnership agreements in sample 45
Average number of covenant classes 7.9
Average number of covenant classes (weighted by fund size) 8.4
Source: Gompers and Lerner (2006)
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In contrast, hedge funds rely less on covenants due to the shorter lock-up periods
and the funds liquidity. Finally, the public nature of the activities of hedge funds,
particularly in the market for corporate control, tends to limit the principal-agent
problems that might otherwise emerge.
It is noteworthy that the average frequency of use of covenants in non-US VC
partnerships is unrelated to the supply and demand of venture capital. Schmidt and
Wahrenburg (2003) show that established European funds are more severely
restricted by the use of three sub-categories of covenants within VC-partnership
agreements. An international comparison of contractual covenants among private
investment funds across countries also indicates a significant difference in
probability of use of covenants (Cumming and Johan 2006). Figure 2 shows the
distribution of use of covenants of international VC-partnership agreements.
In this context, Cumming and Johan (2006) have offered a ‘‘quality of law’’
explanation for the frequency of use of investment covenants imposed by
institutional investors pertaining to GPs’ activities relating to investment decisions,
investment powers, types of investment, fund operations and limitations on liability.
According to Cumming and Johan (2006) the presence of legal counsel that review
covenants would increase the probability of covenants. They find evidence,
moreover, that the quality of law and other institutional and legal practice factors is
positively correlated with the number of covenants relating to fund operations. In
their view, an improvement in the legal system, as measured by an increase in the
Legality Index (a weighed average of the legal index variables introduced by La
Porta et al. (1997, 1998) as defined by Berkowitz et al. (2002)) from 20 to 21
(normal improvement rate for developed country), correlate to a higher the use of an
additional covenant relating to fund operation by about 1%, but an increase in the
Legal Index from 10 to 11 (normal improvement rate for developing country)
increases the probability of the presence of an extra fund operation covenant by
about 2%.
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Fig. 2 Frequency of use of each covenant. Source: Cumming and Johan (2006)
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The above studies emphasize how important it is to recognize the critical role of
management influence in determining the management and structural characteristics
of a fund, the agency problems and control issues that emerge in the investment
process and the conflicts of interest that occur in times of market upheaval. LPs have
high powered incentives which greatly improve their ability to focus on addressing
these problems through negotiating and implementing covenants to protect LPs and
ensure the GP’s incentives serve investors’ interests. Further improvements in the
training of legal counsel that review covenants is likely to positively influence the
frequency of some covenants. A more complete solution would require increases to
the quality of legal systems generally in developing and civil law jurisdictions.
3.3 The relationship between the funds and their portfolio companies
In exchange for their investments, private equity funds usually demand control
rights in addition to their shareholdings. In practice, it appears that private equity
investors often avail themselves of the features of convertible preferred stock.19
Initially, finance scholars argued that convertible preferred stock was an optimal
instrument to control the substantial agency problems related to the investment
process.20 Economic studies show that convertible preferred stock is predominantly
used by venture capitalists to protect themselves against the downside risk of their
investment by providing seniority or priority rights over the common equity.
Convertible preferred stock allows for significant ex post flexibility in the
determination of control rights and the conditions upon which venture capitalists are
allowed to exit their investment. Convertible preferred stock is considered optimal,
on the one hand because it secures downside protection for venture capitalists, and
on the other hand because it gives entrepreneurs incentives to take significant risks
in order to obtain a higher final firm value in the event of success. In fact,
convertible preferred stock limits opportunistic behaviour by allocating exit control
to the venture capitalist. More recent models show that convertibles are an optimal
form of finance when entrepreneurs and venture capitalists are required to introduce
value into the firm sequentially. The use of convertible preferred stock is crucial for
venture capitalists, since, having become active investors, they must obtain a secure
means of exit from their investment.21 The precise scope of the features is
19 See Dent (1992: 1060–1061) (‘[a] separate class of common stock could include these features. Yet,
because they are not typical features of common stock, drafting would be somewhat difficult.’).
20 More recent research has looked at the contractual relationship between institutional investors and
fund managers, suggesting that there is a positive correlation between the quality of a country’s laws and
the use of contractual provisions regulating private equity investment. The implication is that there are
significant benefits to encouraging stronger legal conditions that could benefit fund manger compensation,
fund returns and the development of venture capital markets (Lerner and Schoar 2005; Cumming and
Walz 2009).
21 It is widely acknowledged that convertible preferred stock is the dominant form of security used by
venture capitalists in the United States. This may be due to the standardization of purchase agreements.
See Gilson and Schizer (2003). Commentators argue that there are a number of reasons for the
significantly higher usage of convertibles in the US compared to Europe, Canada and elsewhere
(Cumming and Johan 2008). First, it is assumed that US venture capitalists are more sophisticated and
better established than the venture capitalists elsewhere, which accounts for the significantly lower use of
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established by the terms of the stock purchase contract. Although we speak of a
contract, the rights must traditionally be defined in the corporation’s articles of
incorporation for the purpose of certainty of information.
The following terms can usually be distinguished: preference on dividends and
liquidation, voting rights, conversion rights and anti-dilution provisions, redemption
of the preferred shares, pre-emptive rights, go-along rights and information rights.
All of these rights must be defined in detail. It is also the case that, in addition to the
contractual provisions provided to preferred shareholders, they are offered certain
minimum protections through fiduciary obligations.22
Venture capitalists can acquire preferred shares with a cumulative dividend right.
This right means that if a preferred dividend is not paid in any year, it accumulates;
the accumulated arrears must be paid in full before any dividends are paid on
common stock. Preferred shares can also be non-cumulative, so that the portfolio
firm has no further obligation for unpaid dividends. In between these two scenarios
are partially cumulative preferred shares. Furthermore, venture capitalists some-
times use participating preferred shares. In such a case, in addition to the dividend
preference, they may participate with the common stock in any dividends declared
on that stock. In practice, since most innovative start-ups scarcely yield any profits
during the period of the venture capital financing, the parties often agree that the
corporation pays no dividends at all.
Preferred stock usually grants the venture capitalists a liquidation preference,
which provides that on liquidation a designated amount—typically, the price at
which the preferred shares were issued—should be paid to the preferred shareholder
before any distributions are made with respect to common stock. In the worst-case
scenario, this right gives the venture capitalists a senior claim to cash flow and
distributions in liquidation, through which they can retrieve at least some of their
investment. It shifts the risk from the venture capitalists to the entrepreneur.
Preferred shares are normally non-voting shares. However, venture capitalists
often procure convertible preferred stock that confers a right to vote. The voting
rights typically correspond to the number of shares they would have after
conversion. They are entitled to vote as a separate voting group on amendments that
are burdensome to them as a single class and are beneficial to other classes.23 If the
Footnote 21 continued
these instruments by non-US venture capitalists. Second, the size of the European debt market and the
preference on the part of venture capitalists in Europe for straight debt may account for a lower rate of use
of convertible preferred stock. Third, Gilson and Schizer (2003) have argued that US venture capitalists
are attracted to the tax advantages associated with convertible preferred stock, which allows them to make
a lower valuation for the entrepreneur’s common shares. Implicit in this argument is the view that the tax
incentives connected to the reduced initial valuation of common stock for venture capitalists are the
reason for the significantly higher use of convertible preferred stock in the US, rather than the agency
cost-reducing qualities of the instrument identified by models created by finance scholars.
22 Note that under Delaware law preferred stockholders are protected by the core fiduciary duties of care,
loyalty and good faith. Any special rights attached to preferred stock are interpreted like any other
contractual rights. See e.g. Benchmark Capital v Vague, 2002 WL 1732423 at 6; Sanders v Devine 1997
WL 599539 at 5.
23 The Model Business Corporation Act (1984) §10.04 lists nine types of proposed amendments that
trigger the right of a class of shares to vote as a separate voting group on an amendment.
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venture capitalists do not actually control the majority of the votes, this ‘class
voting’ mechanism protects them against troublesome resolutions. In addition, the
class of preferred shares is typically entitled to elect half or more of the members of
the board of directors.24 This implies that venture capitalists may participate directly
in management by serving on the board themselves. In so doing, they have
substantial control over the board. It also gives them the opportunity to replace the
entrepreneur as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) if the business is in danger of
failing.
Venture capitalists typically elect take convertible preferred stock. If the business
is successful and an IPO is feasible, the venture capitalists may, at their option,
convert their preferred shares into marketable common shares and sell them
profitably as soon as the corporation goes public.25 The articles of incorporation
must contain the conversion ratio at which the conversion is to take place.26 A
favourable ratio to venture capitalists may mitigate window-dressing by the
entrepreneur, since manipulating short-term signals may persuade the venture
capitalists to exercise the conversion option and so dilute the ownership of the
entrepreneurial team. The ratio may also depend on the performance of the business,
i.e., ‘if the company does well, the conversion price might be higher’. A contingent
conversion ratio will increase the short-term incentive to the entrepreneurial team,
as a high price due to good (short-term) results may prevent the venture capitalists
from converting. In such a case, ‘window dressing’ would decrease the chance of
dilution of the common stock held by the entrepreneur and his key employees.
In addition, the articles of incorporation normally provide for antidilution
provisions to take into account changes that have occurred in the number of
outstanding common stocks since the preferred stock was issued. They ensure that
the venture capitalists retain a relatively steady level of ownership.
Preferred stock is often made redeemable at the option of the venture capitalist
(often called a ‘mandatory redemption’, a ‘put’ or a ‘buyout’). This right supplies an
exit mechanism in the event that the business ‘is financially viable but too small to
go public’. The redemption price is typically the original purchase price augmented
by a reasonable rate of interest. In a few isolated instances, the entrepreneurial team
has the power to redeem the preferred shares from the venture capitalists on behalf
of the corporation.
The venture capitalists are usually entitled to purchase new shares proposed to be
issued pro rata basis with their common-stock-equivalent holdings. Such a pre-
24 See the Model Business Corporation Act (1984) §8.04 provides that directors may be elected by
certain classes of shareholders. As for the removal of directors, §8.08(b) provides that if a director is
elected by a voting group of shareholders, only the shareholders of that voting group may participate in
the vote to remove him.
25 Agreements usually confer on the venture capitalists the right to register their shares with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for public sale. ‘Piggyback’ rights entitle the investor to
include his stock in the firm’s public offerings. ‘Demand rights’ go further by allowing an investor to
compel the firm to register the investor’s stock with the SEC. See Dent (1992, pp. 1049–1050).
26 The ratio determines how many shares of common stock a preferred shareholder receives upon the
exercise of the conversion.
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emptive right avoids the dilution of the proportional interest of the venture
capitalists in the corporation.
In the event of the entrepreneur and the key employees receiving an offer to sell
their stock, most preferred shareholder contracts provide that the venture capitalists
can sell their shares after conversion at the same time and on the same terms. Such a
go-along right protects the venture capitalists from the unwanted influence of a third
party over the business. While they cannot prevent the third party from buying the
shares, they can demand that the third party buy them out on the same terms as the
entrepreneur and the key employees. This right prohibits the entrepreneurial team
from selling their stock unless venture capitalists are offered the same terms.
Finally, the articles of incorporation often specify that the firm must maintain and
provide specific records, including financial statements and budgets. They also
provide that the venture capitalists can inspect the business’s financial accounts at
will. The right to information is essential, as (1) information is necessary for venture
capitalists to use preference rights intelligently, (2) it restrains the entrepreneurial
team from engaging in reckless conduct, and (3) in most states, corporation statutes
by default restrict the right to inspect the books and records either to certain
documents or to certain events.
What becomes even more pressing in an era in which hedge funds and private
equity are playing an increasingly important role in corporate governance and
corporate control. The rapid transformation of activism by hedge funds and private
equity is heralded by some as the next corporate governance revolution. This
activism is, as we have seen, characterized typically by mergers and corporate
restructurings, increased leverage, dividend recapitalizations, and the replacement
of management and board members. The result has been that if a firm is
mismanaged, these funds use their capital in a focused and leveraged way so as to
take over control and initiate different, more beneficial and effective business
strategies. Yet even though they have the potential to impose tremendous discipline
on boards and managers of firms, these funds are often opaque and complex.
Moreover, hedge funds are being accused of neglecting long-term goals and
pursuing short-term payoff. The risk involved in investing huge amounts of capital
calls for corporate governance measures for investment funds. By focusing on
regulation, we seek to contribute a better understanding of the advantages and
limitations of investor-owned firms.
4 Regulation of private equity funds
Policymakers and the media have drawn attention to the confusion that private
equity funds are currently causing in the world of finance and corporate governance.
The recent wave of private equity-based buyouts of publicly listed companies has
prompted questions and political controversy about whether private equity is always
beneficial. For example, the purchase of VNU, a global information and media
company, by a consortium of private equity firms triggered concerns that the
advantages of taking the firm private, including cost reduction and increased
operational efficiency, may not offset the costs involved when the delisting of
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companies entails a significant reduction in liquidity of equity markets. Moreover,
the sophisticated use of financial engineering techniques, in particular the funding of
acquisitions with large amounts of debt, which are subsequently loaded on the
acquired businesses, raises suspicion.
The ongoing debate over the costs and benefits of the rise of private equity raises
the question as to whether more detailed regulation and supervision of funds is
required. Given the contractual mechanism that prevail in the governance of both
private equity and hedge funds, an initial hands-off approach might be warranted.
What is more, private equity are evolving into more transparent investment vehicles.
First, institutional investors, demanding better risk management, encouraged equity
funds to adopt better valuation techniques and controls. Second, buy-out groups
attempted to improve their reputation and image by joining respectable industry
bodies, like the British Venture Capital Association, or initiating the establishment
of such a group in their respective countries, such as the Private Equity Council in
the United States. The purpose of these groups is to conduct research and, more
importantly, provide information about the industry to policymakers, investors and
other interested parties. Lastly, in search for more stable capital, private equity
funds increasingly raise or are planning to raise money by listing funds on public
markets. By floating shares or units of a fund, advisors voluntarily subject
themselves to regulatory supervision. The contractual nature of private equity funds
in combination with the trend towards self-regulation by industry groups suggests
that the sophisticated players in the private equity industry are themselves capable
of disciplining opportunistic behaviour by fund managers and advisors. This
strategy, which ensures that possible rules and regulations are in line with both best
practices and standards applied in the world of private equity, is examined in the
next section.
4.1 Self-regulation
This section will explain the function of soft law principles and industry standards
specifically tailored to private equity funds in assisting general partners and
investors from overcoming bargaining problems and uncertainties connected with
the operation of private equity funds. The following questions will be addressed. Is
there a credible role for best practice guidelines in improving the contractual
governance arrangements of private equity funds? Does each industry segment
require the introduction of governance guidelines specific to the segment and its
business model? Which institutions or group is best placed to develop the right set
of principles? Do governmental committees or industry-based associations ensure
the creation of optimal guidelines? Having seen that the procedures involved for the
creation of best practice guidelines enhance integrity and awareness for the business
practices and stakeholders, the question is whether what matters most is the
substantive variation in guidelines across the industry sector or the standardization
achieved by a general code.
Answers to most of these questions can be found in practice which already shows
the emergence of distinctive guidelines for private equity firms. A soft law example
is the launch of the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) Corporate
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Governance Guidelines for the Management of Privately Held Companies in 2005
(European Venture Capital Association 2005). Designed in consultation with
industry experts, the EVCA guidelines provide a set of optional measures that focus
on the staged investment decisions of venture capital and private equity funds and
the contractual circumstances surrounding these investments. In this regard,
provisions that enunciate the duties and responsibilities in relation to design and
execution of corporate strategy are a core feature of the recommendations.
These corporate governance recommendations supplement other standards and
guidelines in order to provide greater transparency to the venture capital industry.
For instance, the development of a system of timely reporting is called for with
respect to annual reports and financial statements on a company website within
6 months of year-end. Indeed, to the extent that investors need to be informed about
the operation of the fund, the guidelines call for a financial review that refers to the
risk management objectives and policies in light of the risks and uncertainties facing
the company, and the impact of increased leverage and the other fund risks.
Likewise, investors in such funds invariably expect timely disclosures and therefore
the EVCA guidelines specify that management should issue an interim statement
not more than 3 months after mid-year. In addition to these guidelines on financial
disclosure and governance, there are specific reporting requirements for General
Partners pertaining to fund management team composition, including senior
members of the general partner team and supervisory committee, experience and
responsibility for management of the fund, as well as fund factors such as stage and
industry focus, holding periods and fund history. Also pertinent is the compensation
and categorization of the limited partners, as well as the investors countries of origin
and their institutional characteristics.
Industry based guidelines have also appeared at the national level. For example, a
separate code for private equity funds was introduced by the Dutch Private Equity
and Venture Capital Association in 2007. Experts immediately praised the Code for
encouraging more transparency with respect of fund practices and its educative
value to firms. While there had been some doubts about the willingness of firms to
adopt these practices in their dealings with investors and third parties, the Code will
become mandatory for all member of the Association at the end of the one year trial
period. With the introduction of the Code, the Association aims to professionalize
private equity firms by encouraging the adoption of standardized practices, such as
fund managers providing clients with clarity regarding their plans and investment
decisions, and to enhance accountability by taking into account the considerations
of other interested parties when making investments in the Netherlands.
The governance principles work in tandem with other core features of the Code
in order to provide better transparency for investors in private equity firms. This is
important, since there are restrictions on the ability of investors to obtain superior
information on fund operation and the management of their investments. The
principles include, first, that the fund manager take into account the specific
information needs of investors based on the specific contractual conditions between
the parties. Second, pertaining to the management of the portfolio company, private
equity firms—including other shareholders and fund management—must make
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disclosures about their investment objectives, financial structure, investor partici-
pation period, and the responsibilities of the supervising party.
In the case of buyouts, the Code obliges the fund to disclose a plan within
six months of the transaction. In addition, buyout funds are required to comply with
traditional corporate governance measures regarding the internal organization of the
company, which are designed to improve the relations between the parties, limit
potential agency problems and enhance firm performance. Third, with respect to
other shareholders of the portfolio company, a Code requires that shareholders must
make disclosures about their decision-making powers, the frequency and content of
disclosures, management of the portfolio company, confidentiality agreements and
loan agreements. In terms of the monitoring and supervision of portfolio companies,
private equity funds have an incentive to achieve high standards of management
supervision in order to maximize performance and manage the activities of the fund
in the interests of the parties involved. To this end, the Code recommends the fund’s
supervisory board may can serve to limit the conflicts of interests between the fund
manager and fund investors by appointing qualified, knowledgeable members that
can act independently. To be sure, the Code recognizes that the conflicts will be
easier to manage when the supervisory board has full information regarding the
investor and management agreements. Finally, fund managers should have
incentives to engage with other stakeholders, such as creditors, about management
and investor agreements.
It is noteworthy that a similar set of guidelines were produced in November 2007
by Sir David Walker’s working group for the British Venture Capital Association
(BVCA) on disclosure and transparency in the UK private equity industry. The
guidelines, which are a voluntary set of rules to be implemented on a comply or
explain basis, require greater disclosure by private equity firms and their portfolio
companies. While the purposes of the guidelines are similar to the Dutch code, it is
notable that there are differences in the both the scope and details of the guidelines.
It is conjectured that the differences in the guidelines may indicate the growth of
some transactional structures (e.g., growth capital transactions) in the UK which
play a smaller role in the Netherlands. Focused primarily on buyout activities of
private equity firms, the Walker Guidelines (Guidelines) covers firms that advise or
management investment funds that own or control one or more UK portfolio
companies. The Guidelines cover portfolio companies that generate more than 50%
of their revenues in the UK, employ more than 1,000 employees, and that exceed
300 million pounds of market capitalization plus market premium, or 500 million
pounds in enterprise value.
There are three main areas covered by these comply or explain measures. The
Guidelines provide transparency requirements for private equity firms, which
include the filing of an annual report and financial statements on a company website
within four months of the end of year as against the current nine months. As is the
case with the Dutch code, portfolio firms should also file a short interim statement
not more than two months after mid-year. At the same time, general partners are
required to publish an annual review, accessible on their website, which should
serve as an effective channel to communicate their business orientation and the
governance structure of their portfolio companies. Finally, there is an expectation
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that the private equity firms will provide to the BVCA, on confidential basis, data
for the previous year involving the amounts of capital raised, acquisitions and
disposals by transaction value, fee payments made to advisers and for other services
related to the establishment and management of their funds, and for exits. Overall,
the Walker Group did not envisage the need for new regulatory or legislative
provisions on disclosure in the UK. Consistent with this view, the Walker Group
expects that the soft law framework, reinforced by the active monitoring and review
role played by the BVCA (along with the likelihood that institutional investors will
also strive to monitor the disclosure and governance activities of the portfolio
companies in important respects) will provide sufficient incentives for private equity
firms to comply with the guidelines.
It goes without saying that a specific set of guidelines induces private equity
funds to pay increasing attention to the importance of professional governance
structures. Besides enhancing the likelihood of the adoption of good governance
practices, optional industry guidelines can serve another important goal. They can
function as a self-regulatory mechanism in response to increased political pressures
for greater disclosure and transparency of fund capital structures and management
practices. Although voluntary by nature, guidelines could be used by the industry as
a ‘sword of Damocles’ in the event of non-compliance. If non-compliers were
expelled from the industry’s association, the voluntary guidelines would arguably
have a mandatory effect, as with the Dutch code. The advantage of this approach
over legislative measures is the flexibility and adaptability of the regulations. The
next section considers the circumstances where a combination of industry measures
and government involvement in monitoring the activities of portfolio companies
may prove beneficial to both investors and the industry.
4.2 Co-regulation
In view of the factors discussed above, the challenge is to locate the right mix of soft
law and government measures that encourage funds to effectively disclose and
inform their investors and the market about their performance, investment strategy,
valuation of their investments, fees and debt levels. In order to find the right mix, it
is important to consider co-regulation strategies that rely on industry standards that
are ultimately reinforced by independent monitoring committees.
Co-regulation, which is a combination of governmental and non-governmental
regulatory actions, has the advantages of the predictability and legal certainty of
legislation along with the flexibility and acceptance of self-regulation. Several
factors suggest that it is an effective means to coordinate public and private
resources to manage regulatory risk. First, co-regulation has the possibility of
resolving conflicts through cooperative engagement involving firms choosing from a
variety of mechanisms to manage a specific problems. This model’s success
depends not only on the flexibility of the techniques employed by the parties, but
also on the alignment of the regulatory benefits and the incentives of the parties
engaged in the regulatory process. In theory, financial benefits themselves provide
sufficient incentives, given the removal of regulatory barriers. Second, while co-
regulation models concentrate on identifying the basis for cooperative relational
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advantage, the process largely involves public and private parties in developing ex
ante an appropriate set of standards that can be assessed on objective criteria to
determine which provisions should be implemented.
As noted above, a number of recent factors have led to questions about whether
governments should step up their monitoring and regulation of private equity funds.
Regulators have suggested that economic studies show that the respective benefits
and costs of private equity funds are inconclusive producing little support for new
legislation in the area. In continental Europe, a virtual torrid of press reports on the
negative sentiment resulting from buyouts has stimulated interest in self-regulatory
and industry actors producing codes of conduct for both private equity funds and
private equity backed companies.27 However, co-regulation has worked well in the
case of best practice codes of corporate governance. In this regard, periodic review
of the company compliance is conducted by government-sponsored monitoring
committees which publish the industry-wide compliance level yearly. There are
implications for companies that under-comply or engage in avoidance strategies. In
fact, there is economic evidence, from a number of jurisdictions, that shows a
correlation between a company’s compliance rate and their share price performance.
In the Autumn of 2007, the UK Treasury Select Committee recommended that
the Walker Guidelines be implemented, and that there is room for extending the
Guidelines to facilitate portfolio management standards (communication of
governance approach to stakeholders and mode of investment of portfolio
company), disclosure by general partners (disclosure of performance results and
value creation methods), and transparency regarding the structure and level of
debt.28 More importantly, the Select Committee endorsed the view of requiring
additional independent monitoring of the industry’s code of conduct. Subsequently,
the Walker Guidelines were implemented in fall of 2007.
This is likely to result in greater consistency in disclosure across funds that would
not only benefit institutional investors, pension funds and insurance funds in
meeting their fiduciary duties to their clients, but will inevitably facilitate funds in
their capital raising efforts with investors. Second, we suspect that there are a
number of practices by private equity firms will also be effectively curtailed by an
independent monitoring committee. Consider conflicts of interests. By far and away,
investors are concerned about the evidence pointing to large scale material conflicts
of interests between private equity funds and their managers in relation to the
allocation of their investments. While many of these allocation problems have been
largely addressed by the industry standards, there is concern that abuses may arise in
other contexts, such as between proprietary and advisory activities, or when a
manager plays more than one role in a single transaction. It is worth stressing that
the most effective way of identifying and communicating these conflicts is through
the industry-wide compliance system that is reinforced by an independent monitor.
Although it is inevitable that some fund managers will not be persuaded to comply
27 An example is the launch of the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) Corporate
Governance Guidelines. Designed in consultation with industry experts, the EVCA guidelines provide a
set of optional measures that address the contractual circumstances surrounding venture capital and
private equity investments. See McCahery and Vermeulen (2008).
28 Treasure Select Committee 10th Report Session 2006–2007, 24 July 2007.
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fully with the industry guidelines, it can be expected that additional independent
monitoring will be supplied by a mixture of institutional investor, trade union and
pressure group associations.
Moreover, there is at least a suspicion that self regulation measures and industry
co-regulation are likely to be more effective, given the complexity and range of
activities pursued by private equity funds, than direct regulatory intervention. It is
crucial to recall that the challenge here is to comprehend the amount of work
required by government regulators to simply understand the impact of their
intervention, the scale of their target and its ultimate effectiveness on firms. At the
same time, concerns arise over the decision-making procedures for consultation
with funds and their advisers and the standards of review for evaluating their
compliance. For co-regulation to succeed, consideration must be given to increasing
the level of incentives for parties to abide by the industry wide standards since a
positive approach, as the evidence suggests, will be more beneficial in the long
run.29 To the extent incentives are insufficient to induce individual fund-level
cooperation, we would expect that some level of harmonization might be needed,
given the dispersion of PE funds internationally, to obtain these regulatory goals.30
4.3 The regulatory response
In this section we consider the circumstances where direct government regulation
could usefully supplement the industry mix of contractual and self-regulatory
strategies. In assessing the need for a regulatory response, we have seen that there
are various mechanisms and contractual arrangements available to regulate private
equity participants and their transactions. As we have seen, industry-wide standards
are intended to illustrate how the industry operates, incorporating schemes for the
valuation of investments, the governance of the investment vehicles, the resolution
of conflicts of interest, and the transparency of collective investment vehicles. This
development is, however, limited across jurisdictions since private equity standards
developed by industry bodies have only emerged in the leading countries where
private equity funds have a significance presence. Presumptively, the payoff for
ensuring the widest diffusion of the new industry wide standards is significant. To
date, no empirical analyses have been performed using the EVCA guidelines to
measure compliance across the many separate funds and time periods. Conse-
quently, it may be too early to assess whether these measures have reasonably high
chances for dealing with the problems that have been identified above.
29 This argument has been reinforced recently by EC Commissioner Charles McCreavy in a speech to the
British Venture Capital Association wherein he stated that ‘when we look at the numbers, we can quickly
see that there is a distance to travel. The number of BVCA firms that have signed up to the Walker
Guidelines is a case in point. According to certain reports only 32 out of a possible 200 members would
be currently signatories. The limited reach of the Walker Guidelines is also apparent when we look at the
number of portfolio companies covered by the guidelines. On 56, out of about 1,300 portfolio companies
in the UK that are targeted by private equity investments, are reported to comply with the disclosure and
transparency rules. See, Charlie McCreevy, European Commissioner for Internal Market, ‘Private Equity:
Progress on Disclosure and Transparency (Walker Guidelines)’, EC/SPEECH/08/701.
30 See Cumming and Johan (2007).
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In the United States the increasing attention to private equity has led to questions
as to whether funds and their advisers should be subject to registration and more
rigorous information disclosure. More recently, lawmakers have focused on capital
gains taxation, considering whether a change in the tax code on carried interest is
consistent with the goals of fostering innovation and entrepreneurship. Arguably,
while the debate in the United Kingdom has much in common with US concerns,
such as the parliamentary investigations into taxation of carried interest, the UK
response has managed to diverge slightly with its focus on the whether the regulator
is capable through its different risk-based regulation to meet its statutory objectives.
In this section we document the response by regulators to the rise of the private
equity sector within Europe.31 To this end, we look at the UK’s Financial Service
Authority’s (FSA) recent analysis of the risks posed by private equity buyouts.
With a clear focus on the risks identified, the FSA sought explicitly in a 2006
discussion paper to classify the risks in private equity.32 A most obvious concern is
the risk identified above, namely excessive leverage. The data cited above refer to
increasing multiples, transaction structures being extended and more and more
‘covenant lite’ loan deals. The concern is that with a serious contraction in the credit
market, as we’ve seen recently, there could be a large number of corporate defaults
that might significantly impact the debt and credit markets, respectively. The
significance of this is that banks and other intermediaries might be exposed to
excessively leveraged transactions that could have a detrimental effect on the
balance sheet of a number of large banks.
A second and related concern involves the unclear ownership of economic risk.
At present, private equity and hedge funds rely on increasingly complex financial
transactions, such as credit derivatives, and other risk transfer practices that involve
use of off balance sheet transactions that arguably could exacerbate existing
structural weaknesses and lead to unclear ownership of economic risk. Furthermore,
it is worth noting that the different (and sometimes competing) bankruptcy regimes
could give rise to different claims creating costly barriers for lenders to negotiate
settlements. The evidence suggests, according the to the FSA, that excessive
leverage and obscure ownership of economic risk do not bode well for the UK
economy and are categorized as medium to high significant risks.
Third, private equity funds may, given the shroud of secrecy under which they
operate, face charges related to alleged conflicts of interest between interested fund
managers and fund investors. To the extent, for example, that fund managers are
allowed to participate in transaction in which a private equity fund participates,
there are concerns that managers will capture the greatest source of gains from
themselves at the expense of other investors. To be sure, some fund managers may
still be accused of a conflicts of interest to the extent that they act as a director of a
company owned by the fund. Other potential conflict situations arise where the fund
is a both a source of finance for a buyout of a target firm, which is also a fund client
31 Italian lawmakers introduced a new Corporate Law Reform (Legislative Decree 6/2003, applicable as
of 1 January 2004) which set forth the basis of regulating leveraged buyout transactions. For the
implications on buyouts in Italy, see Cumming and Zambelli (2007).
32 Financial Services Authority, Private Equity: A Discussion Paper on Risk and Regulatory Engagement
(DP 06/6, November 2006).
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or as a result of supplying finance to competing bidders on a deal. Also, there may
be other residual conflicts which funds have incentives to resolve in their favour. On
the whole, therefore, the FSA indicated that the conflict of interests were of high
risk.
Fourth, the other notable concern is the risk of market abuse that could occur in
the context of a buyout transactions and proprietary trading. Much attention is given
to the possibility that material inside information could be disclosed which could
have a detrimental effect on investors. Market abuse is rated as a high risk by the
FSA. Finally, there are other risks, such as market access constraints, market opacity
and the reduction of overall capital market efficiency, that the FSA considers as low
to medium risks. In assessing the risks, it is noteworthy that the market participants
are differentially affected (see Table 6).
It is worth noting that the FSA’s review of the regulatory risks supports the view
that private equity funds are typically subject to relatively light regulatory oversight.
A number of considerations support this view. First, private equity is classified as
alternative investment in which the funds are governed by same company law, tax
and governance requirements that apply to all partnerships and publicly listed
companies involved in the bidding process or other buyout arrangements. Second, it
is worth noting that since private equity funds are not typically involved in issuing
debt or securities in public markets, they are largely free of regulatory oversight in
most jurisdictions. Third, most fund managers contract with clients who are
sophisticated institutional investors or individuals that structure their investment
activity through partnerships and contractual arrangements which provide for
adequate information and investor protections. As a result, private equity firms are
largely outside the scope of existing regulatory regime in most jurisdictions. In the
next section, we discuss the three broad areas in which the regulation of the private
equity market can be considered.
4.4 Legal tools
In this section, we briefly describe four legal tools that are commonly used to deal
with the problems involving participants and transactions in the private equity
market. The four legal tools considered are (1) reporting and disclosure
Table 6 Risk assessment and private equity participants
Participants High Medium Medium Low Low
Risk




Investors Market access Market opacity Reduction in market
efficiency
PE-owned firms Excessive leverage
Source: MacNeil (2008)
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requirements of private equity funds and general partners, (2) enhancing market
access, (3) governance and investor protection measures, and (4) taxation.
4.4.1 Enhancing disclosure and fund reporting
Given the structure of private equity funds, disclosure of financial and operational
information, including the valuation of their investments in their annual accounts,
provides significant benefits to investors and can be an effective tool in limiting
abusive actions by fund managers. Second, well-designed measures on disclosure of
performance results may prove more effective than market (fund) competition in
supplying the incentives to avoid exaggerating valuations of investment returns and
unexited investments. Third, the imposition on the private equity firm to disclose
their management fees and carried interest and the independent oversight body will
allow investors to make a more informed investment decisions.
4.4.2 Enhancing market access
Empirical research on venture capital and private equity shows that the quality of
the legal environment is an important determinant in raising the supply of
investment funds.33 Since exiting is crucial for buyout funds, the creation of a deep
and vibrant securities market is considered crucial for the development of a deep
and liquid market for initial public offerings. It again follows that a hospitable IPO
market may require liberalizing the stock exchange listing rules on board
independence and control, thereby allowing private equity funds to list investment
vehicles. Moreover, given that some markets are characterized by a small number of
dominant firms that limit or restrict access, largely to the detriment of retail
investors, there are good reasons for regulators to address this problem by
facilitating more competition.
4.4.3 Governance and investor protection
Looking at the circumstances the market suffers from harmful conduct has led
regulators to simply place a ban on insider trading and market manipulation. Not
only does the market suffer, but investors may encounter significant losses, which
undermines the confidence in public markets. When it comes to dealing with market
manipulation and related misconduct, the existing mix of securities regulations are
the most effective tool to prevent specific forms of abusive harms and to undertake
investigations. The benefit of this type of intervention is twofold. First, given the
complexity of these transactions and the number of parties involved, the expenditure
of resources to investigate these transactions tends to favor centralized oversight.
Second, there is evidence that regulatory strategies that favor stiff sanctions will
have a strong deterrence effect which offers support for more enforcement actions
by securities regulators.34
33 See generally McCahery and Renneboog (2004).
34 See Karpoff et al. (2008).
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4.4.4 Taxation
Another type of regulatory intervention that affects the private equity market and
fund managers is the taxation of capital gains on the sale of entity interest,
withholding taxes, the deductibility of interest on debt, and the taxation of carried
interest earned by general partners in private equity firms. It is important to note that
a favourable taxation regime is an important determinant to the development of a
favourable private equity environment. Moreover, the supply of efficient tax
vehicles for such investments is considered a necessary mechanism in terms of the
structuring and executing private equity transactions. Therefore, fiscal measure that
are unattractive for both investors and fund managers, such as the proposed increase
in tax on carried interest in the UK and US, will inevitable place serious stress on
the vitality of a private equity market.
The discussion that follows highlights the efforts of lawmakers to enact private
equity reforms that fall under the four categories discussed above.
4.5 Regulatory responses to hedge fund and private equity in Canada, European
Union, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom
The rapid growth in the private equity market in recent years has prompted calls for
the introduction of new regulatory measures to control for conflicts that are likely to
arise between private equity funds and their investors as well as the problems related
to buyouts. We review a few of the measures that have emerged in response to
private equity and activist hedge fund engagements with target companies.
4.5.1 Canada
In Canada, the corporate law system, which operates at both the federal and
provincial level, has long played a central role in regulating many central
transactions, including amalgamations and the sale of all or substantially all assets
of a company. The corporate statutes allocates power to shareholders to approve
such transactions, rights to dissent and a fair value remedy. Canadian securities
regulation operate also under a two-tier system and regulate such activities as:
annual and continuous disclosure, insider trading, public offers, and tender offers. In
the case of going private transactions, the Ontario Securities Commission regulation
provides a system for a formal valuation that must be prepared for the shares held by
minority shareholders, approval by minority shareholders (depending on the
transaction), and the recommendation that a special committee of directors negotiate
with the controlling shareholder or related parties and ensure that all shareholders
receive fair disclosure and the right, where necessary, to approve the transaction.
Tax reforms have been undertaken recently in Canada to stimulate investment in
private equity and venture capital. In particular, Canada and the US singed in
September 2007 a new protocol to the Canada-US Income tax treaty which provides
for US resident member of an limited liability company to claim benefits under the
Treaty. US LLCs, which are fiscally transparent for US federal income tax purposes
are not recognized by the Canada Revenue Agency under the Treaty. Thus, the
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effect of the protocol is to allow gains realized by certain LLCs on the sale of shares
of a Canadian corporation and which will apply to dividends received by an LLC
with US resident members and the reduced branch tax rate of 5% applies to
repatriated earnings of a Canadian branch of an LLC with US resident members that
are companies.
4.5.2 Germany
Recently, Germany introduced legislation to curb co-operation between sharehold-
ers on share votes, which would be deemed ‘acting in concert.’ More specifically,
the German Federal Cabinet adopted a draft bill for the Act on Limitations of Risks
Relating to Financial Investments or Risikobegrenzungsgesetz (Risks Limitation
Act), which was passed on 27 June 2008 by the Deutsche Bundestag and was
approved by the Bundestag on 4 July 2008 and came into force on 19 August 2008.
While the draft bill would clearly have deterred private equity and hedge fund
activism, the legislation actually adopted is unlikely to damper legitimate
communication between large and small shareholders.
Under the new Act, concerted action will apply not only to cooperation on the
voting right behaviour but also to the coordination of other shareholders’ interests
outside the shareholders’ meeting. Second, the Act has also provided a basis for
determining when acting in concert would be extended to coordinated conduct of
shareholders. Examples would includes cases where shareholders agreed to
coordinate their voting behaviour or if they agreed to cooperate based on long
term strategy to influence or alter the target firm’s business goals. Naturally,
agreements that are designed to affect the composition of the supervisory board and
the appointment of its chairman would not fall within the ambit of the reform unless
the replaced board members or chairman used their power to introduce a new
business strategy for the firm. The legislation may serve to deter some potentially
damaging actions by activist hedge funds and buyout funds and consequently
insulate boards and directors so that they can focus on the long-term interests of the
company. However, the reform is likely to have an effect not only on activist
shareholders motivated by short-term incentives, but also on institutional investors
that might be perceived to be cooperating with other investors when exercising their
right to vote or when using their power to call an extraordinary meeting or when
undertaking other actions to protect the interests of shareholders.
4.5.3 Netherlands
In the Netherlands, a number of reforms have been prompted by a recent wave of
high profile buyouts of Dutch listed companies. Unsurprisingly, the Dutch Minister
of Finance has proposed, based on a recommendation from the Monitoring
Committee Corporate Governance, lowering the notification threshold for share-
holdings in listed companies, under the Transparency Directive, form 5 to 3%.
Furthermore, the Minister recommended a change in the disclosure rules mandating
a higher threshold (from 1 to 3%) to gain the right to include agenda items at the
shareholders’ annual general meeting. Finally, the EU Takeover Directive has been
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implemented which requires a shareholder that owns more than 30% in a listed
company to make an unconditional offer for the outstanding shares of the target
company.
4.5.4 United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the Treasury Select Committee Report recommended that
the Walker Guidelines, as noted above, be implemented and proposed an
independent monitoring committee to ensure industry’s compliance with the code.
Also, The Pre-Budget Report of the Chancellor addressed the issue of carried
interest, declaring that, from 6 April 2008, capital gains tax will be charged at a rate
of 18% and both taper relief and indexation will be withdrawn. The change will
involve an 80% increase in the marginal tax rate applicable on investments held for
less than 2 years. However, there has been little done with respect to carried interest
being classified as income.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzed the regulatory alternatives for the private equity and hedge fund
industry. We examined the structure of fund formation and operation, and the
system of fixed and performance fees that are designed to align investor and fund
manager’s interests. In particular, we argued that while contractual mechanism
allow parties to structure their particular ownership and investment instruments
according to their own preferences, legal and institutional differences may explain
the differences in fees and fund performance across jurisdictions. We noted that the
industry’s contractual system of regulation is being usefully supplemented by self-
regulatory measures designed to improve the transparency and accountability of
private equity funds and hedge funds. We then examined the costs and benefits of
industry based measures, arguing that the strength of the industry self-regulation
outweighs its weaknesses.
Having explored the benefits of both contractual and self-regulatory techniques,
we considered whether, under certain conditions, co-regulation is attractive measure
to support industry body monitoring and compliance measures. As we made clear, a
system of co-regulation can induce, if properly designed, effective compliance by
providing an effective threat in those hard cases when self-regulation fails. We
turned to review the regulatory measures currently in place designed to provide
important checks limit market abuses by some fund managers and to facilitate
growth and innovation. In this context, we showed that there is a well-developed
framework of corporate and securities law that is appropriate for dealing with
private equity transactions and parties to these transactions. In particular, we
indicated that European policymakers have focused on implementing laws recently
on the regulation of takeovers, disclosure and the prohibition of market abuse and
insider trading that will improve the procedures for takeovers and buyouts while
protecting the interests of investors and promoting confidence in the market. Finally,
we examined some of the recent changes in fiscal measures in Canada and the
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United Kingdom and the governance and investor protection measures that have
been promulgated in the Netherlands and Germany in response to institutional
investor activism.
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